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p. 129). More recently the bioethicist Leon Kass (1997)
has written about “the wisdom of repugnance.” He
urges policy makers and the public to avoid judging
technological innovations such as cloning on purely util-
itarian grounds; rather, people should take into account
their feelings of disgust, for such feelings tell us about
boundaries that we should not cross. 
In this article we cannot say whether people ought to
follow their feelings of disgust; we are concerned with
whether they actually do use such feelings to guide their
judgments and with the limiting conditions on such use.
However, philosophers who argue for the importance of
“psychological realism” in ethics say that philosophers
must know the psychological facts before they can issue
normative guidance (Flanagan, 1991). There are several
good reasons for supposing that disgust does in fact
shape moral judgments, even when it is extraneous to
the action being judged. 
The social intuitionist model of moral judgment
(Haidt, 2001) builds on the insights of Hume to suggest
that moral judgment is generally a result of quick gut
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How, and for whom, does disgust influence moral judg-
ment? In four experiments participants made moral
judgments while experiencing extraneous feelings of dis-
gust. Disgust was induced in Experiment 1 by exposure
to a bad smell, in Experiment 2 by working in a dis-
gusting room, in Experiment 3 by recalling a physically
disgusting experience, and in Experiment 4 through a
video induction. In each case, the results showed that
disgust can increase the severity of moral judgments rel-
ative to controls. Experiment 4 found that disgust had a
different effect on moral judgment than did sadness. In
addition, Experiments 2-4 showed that the role of dis-
gust in severity of moral judgments depends on partici-
pants’ sensitivity to their own bodily sensations. Taken
together, these data indicate the importance—and
specificity—of gut feelings in moral judgments. 
Keywords: disgust; emotion; morality; embodiment; embodied
cognition
The grand tradition of moral philosophy has gener-ally extolled the virtues of reason. For instance,
Immanuel Kant (1785/1959) urged people to apply the
categorical imperative, that is, to act only in such a way
that one could consistently will that the principle guid-
ing one’s actions be widely adopted by other people. The
utilitarian tradition (e.g., J. S. Mill) offered a method of
calculating the correct course of action based on
expected utility. Yet against this backdrop of rational-
ism, there have been occasional voices suggesting that
people rely on affective intuitions. David Hume, for
example, wrote that “morality is determined by senti-
ment. It defines virtue to be whatever mental action or
quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of
approbation; and vice the contrary” (Hume, 1777/1960,
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feelings, much like aesthetic judgment. Moral reasoning
plays several roles in the model: People search for reasons to
justify their quick intuitive responses, people use reasoning to
share their judgments with others and persuade them to agree,
and people rely on reasoning when they have no initial intu-
ition or when they have conflicting intuitions. Therefore,
moral reasoning is an important part of moral life, but for
most people, most of the time, most of the action is in the
quick, automatic, affective evaluations they make of people
and events (see Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Fazio,
Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986). 
The notion that affective processes influence judgments
and evaluations has also been systematically investigated
within the affect-as-information framework (Schwarz &
Clore, 1983, 1988). Affective feelings provide information
about the momentary value of objects and situations.
When making evaluative judgments, people attend to their
own feelings, as if asking themselves: How do I feel about
it? Thus, consistent with Hume’s statement, people gener-
ally like what they feel good about and dislike what they
feel bad about. As a consequence, affective feelings have
been shown to influence ratings of life satisfaction (Schwarz
& Clore, 1983), estimates of risk (Gasper & Clore, 1998;
Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001), and other
evaluative judgments (e.g., Esses & Zanna, 1995; Forgas,
Bower, & Krantz, 1984; Forgas & Moylan, 1991; Keltner,
Locke, & Audrain, 1993; Ottati & Isbell, 1996). 
Experimental work on the role of affect on judgment
has often focused on general inductions of positive and
negative mood (Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 1988), with
additional studies addressing specific emotions such as
fear (Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Loewenstein et al., 2001),
anger (Bodenhausen, Shepard, & Kramer, 1994;
DeSteno, Petty, Wegener, & Rucker, 2000; Keltner,
Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993; Lerner & Keltner, 2001),
and disgust (Lerner, Small, & Loewenstein, 2004;
Wheatley & Haidt, 2005).
Disgust evolved to help our omnivorous species
decide what to eat in a world full of parasites and
microbes that spread by physical contact (Rozin &
Fallon, 1987; Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2000).
Disgust indicates that a substance either should be
avoided or, if ingestion has already occurred, should be
expelled. Although disgust evolved as a food-related
emotion, it was well suited for use as an emotion of
social rejection. Across many cultures, the words and
facial expressions used to reject physically disgusting
things are also used to reject certain kinds of socially
inappropriate people and behaviors, some that involve
the inappropriate use of the body (e.g., cannibalism,
pedophilia, torture), others that do not (e.g., hypocrisy,
fawning, betrayal) (Haidt, Rozin, McCauley, & Imada,
1997). However, as with other emotions, feelings of dis-
gust can be transferred to objects for which they are
irrelevant. Indeed, Lerner et al. (2004) showed that rela-
tive to being in a neutral mood, experimentally induced
feelings of disgust reduced the amount of money partic-
ipants were willing to pay for certain objects. 
Feelings of disgust fit particularly well into approaches
that see emotion and cognition as fundamentally embod-
ied (e.g., Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-
Gruber, & Ric, 2005; Prinz, 2004). More than any other
emotion, disgust feels like a “gut” feeling, and because
of its link to nausea, disgust may be the most effective
emotion at triggering the gastroenteric nervous system.
It also fits well into theories such as Damasio’s (1994)
somatic marker hypothesis. In this view, bodily reac-
tions to real events (e.g., nausea, arousal) come to be so
well learned that whenever people merely think about a
similar situation, they get an “as-if” reaction in the
parts of their brains that control or sense those reac-
tions. These flashes of affect then guide behavior and
judgment.
One study used hypnosis to directly implant somatic
markers of disgust. Wheatley and Haidt (2005) gave a
posthypnotic suggestion to highly hypnotizable partici-
pants to feel a flash of disgust at an arbitrary word (take
or often). These hypnotic disgust words were sometimes
embedded in short moral judgment vignettes. In two
experiments, the presence of a hypnotic disgust word
made moral judgments more severe. In an unexpected
finding, the presence of a hypnotic disgust word in a story
that contained no transgression caused one third of the
participants to rate the action as somewhat morally wrong,
even when they could find no reason whatsoever to back
up their condemnation. In these cases, affective intuitions
are obviously leading people astray. 
In the current research, we examined the disgust–
morality connection in a different way. Using four dis-
tinct ways of inducing disgust, we addressed the follow-
ing questions: First, are all moral judgments influenced
by disgust or only those that contain actions involving
physical disgust? Second, are other, nonmoral judg-
ments affected as well? Third, is the effect driven by
emotional feelings or activated concepts of disgust?
Fourth, does any negative emotion (e.g., sadness) make
moral judgments more severe, or is there something spe-
cial about disgust? 
EXPERIMENT 1
As a first step, we conducted a conceptual replication
of the Wheatley and Haidt (2005) study using a differ-
ent method. Inspired by demonstrations that smells can
have subtle but powerful effects on cognitive processes
(Holland, Hendriks, & Aarts, 2005; Rotton, 1983), we
exposed some participants to a disgusting smell—a
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One-hundred twenty-seven Stanford students (55
male) participated individually in an outdoor setting in
exchange for candy. Only students who were passing
through the area (as opposed to stationary individuals
who might have observed others participating) were
recruited. Five participants were excluded from analysis
because of noncompliance with instructions, and 2 were
excluded because they guessed the experimental
hypothesis, leaving 40 participants in each condition.
Materials
The fart spray (purchased at www.forumnovelties.com)
consisted of ammonium sulfide in a water solution. When
the solution is sprayed, hydrogen sulfide, a component of
flatulence, is released alongside ammonia. The resultant
odor is unpleasant but harmless at low levels.
Procedure
Odor manipulation. Participants were randomly
assigned to one of three conditions differing in the level
of disgusting odor present. The conditions were identi-
cal except for the quantity of fart spray applied to the
bag lining a trash bucket hidden approximately 6 ft
from the participant. In the control condition, no fart
spray was present; in the mild-stink condition, four
sprays were applied to the bag; in the strong-stink con-
dition, eight sprays were applied to the bag. The bag
was replaced after testing each participant, and used
bags were sealed and deposited into a larger receptacle
situated over 100 ft from the experiment location.
Before applying fart spray to a newly placed trash bag—
or, in the control condition, testing a participant with-
out any fart spray application—the experimenter
waited for an additional 3 min to allow for any linger-
ing odor to dissipate. Pretesting revealed that the fart
spray odor retained its pungency in the testing area for
as long as the treated bag was present.
Moral judgments. Using 7-point Likert scales, partic-
ipants responded to four vignettes related to moral judg-
ments (see the appendix for vignettes and scales). The
four vignettes gauged participants’ support for the legal-
ization of marriage between first cousins (Marriage),
approval of sex between first cousins (Sex), moral judg-
ments of driving rather than walking to work (Driving),
and approval of a studio’s decision to release a morally
controversial film (Film). Marriage and Sex represented
scenarios that, according to pretesting, tended to elicit
substantial disgust from control participants. Driving
and Film represented scenarios that, according to
pretesting, tended to elicit little disgust from control
participants.1 Thus, variation in the results obtained for
the two types of vignettes might suggest limitations or
moderators of the relationship between induced disgust
and moral judgments.
Manipulation checks. Following the moral judgment
items, participants indicated on 7-point Likert scales (a)
how disgusted they currently felt (from not at all dis-
gusted to extremely disgusted); (b) whether they were
consciously aware of any unpleasant odor while they
were answering the moral judgment questions, and if
so, how much the odor bothered them (from didn’t
notice any smell to stench completely nauseated me); (c)
how much they thought that any environmental odor
affected their answers to the moral judgment questions
(from didn’t affect my answers at all to strongly affected
my answers—this item was not a manipulation check);
and (d) whether they could, at present, detect any
unpleasant odor, and if so, how much the odor both-
ered them (from no smell detectable to extremely nau-
seating stench). 
Results
Unless otherwise noted, one-way ANOVAs were
used with condition (control, mild stink, strong stink) as
the independent variable. Whenever omnibus ANOVAs
yielded significant results, they were followed by pair-
wise comparisons of means using Tukey’s honestly sig-
nificant difference tests.
Manipulation Checks
Self-reported disgust varied significantly as a func-
tion of condition, F(2, 117) = 13.69, p < .001, ηp2 =
0.19. Post hoc tests revealed that strong-stink partici-
pants reported feeling significantly more disgusted (M =
2.38, SD = 1.31) than did mild-stink (M = 1.50, SD =
0.78) or control (M = 1.33, SD = 0.66) participants.
Contrary to prediction, mild-stink participants’ disgust
levels did not differ significantly from those of control
participants.
Self-reported conscious awareness of an unpleasant
odor during the moral judgments phase varied signifi-
cantly as a function of condition, F(2, 117) = 41.01, p <
.001, ηp2 = 0.31. Post hoc tests revealed that strong-stink
participants were significantly more bothered by an
unpleasant odor during the moral judgments (M = 3.13,
SD = 0.20) than were mild-stink participants (M = 2.13,
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SD = 0.20), who in turn were significantly more bothered
by an odor than were control participants (M = 1.10,
SD = 0.20). In each condition, only 1 or 2 participants
(out of 40) believed that their moral judgments had been
affected at all by any environmental odor present.
Self-reported awareness of an unpleasant odor at
present—that is, after participants had been cued to try
to detect an odor in their environment—also varied sig-
nificantly as a function of condition, F(2, 117) = 56.30,
p < .001, ηp2 = 0.49. Post hoc tests revealed that strong-
stink participants were significantly more bothered by
an unpleasant odor at present (M = 3.80, SD = 1.51)
than were mild-stink participants (M = 2.38, SD = 1.05),
who in turn were significantly more bothered by an odor
than were control participants (M = 1.18, SD = 0.55). 
Moral Judgments
The main results for the moral judgment items are
presented in Table 1. For each participant, the average
severity of moral judgment across the four vignettes was
calculated, with lower scores indicating more severe
condemnation. As expected, mean moral judgment var-
ied significantly as a function of condition, F(2, 117) =
7.43, p = .001, ηp2 = 0.11. Post hoc tests revealed that
mild-stink participants and strong-stink participants
were both more severe in their average moral judgments
than were control participants. The mild-stink and
strong-stink participants did not differ.
To examine whether the vignettes’ inherent disgusting-
ness moderated the effect of our disgust manipulation on
moral judgments, the average severity of moral judgment
for each type of vignette (disgusting, including Marriage
and Sex; not disgusting, including Driving and Film) was
calculated. In a two-way ANOVA with disgustingness of
scenario (disgusting vs. not disgusting) as a within-
subjects factor and condition (control, mild stink, strong
stink) as a between-subjects factor, the interaction term
was nonsignificant, F < 1.2, p > .33. Thus, the moral
scenarios’ disgustingness did not moderate the effect of
our disgust manipulation on moral judgments.
Discussion
Experiment 1 replicated Wheatley and Haidt’s (2005)
basic finding that the presence of extraneous disgust can
make moral judgments more severe. It is interesting that
the effect of extraneous disgust on moral judgment was
not moderated by the inherent disgustingness of the object
of judgment. This lack of moderation should be inter-
preted cautiously, however, because our “disgusting”
vignettes (e.g., first-cousin marriage) in this experiment
were not extremely high in disgust. To investigate this
issue further, we included some much more disgusting
vignettes in our follow-up experiments.
Wheatley and Haidt (2005) found that some of their
participants showed a large effect of hypnotic disgust,
whereas others showed no effect. Might some people
more than others look to their bodily reactions for guid-
ance? As a next step we explored whether individual dif-
ferences might contribute to how strongly participants’
moral judgments are affected by a disgust manipulation. 
EXPERIMENT 2
Research suggests that people differ in terms of how
sensitive they are to their own “gut feelings.” Some
people are very good at detecting the slightest changes
in bodily sensations; for example, they notice feelings of
hunger easily. Other people forget that they have not
eaten in many hours until they see a clock and realize it
is lunchtime. Such individual differences affect whether
people infer emotional feelings from their physical sen-
sations. For example, some people report feeling happy
when they are induced to put on a smile, whereas others
do not (Laird & Crosby, 1974). This difference in
response to bodily cues is stable over time and consistent
TABLE 1: Moral Permissibility by Condition, Experiment 1
Moral Judgment Severity
Control Mild Stink Strong Stink
Vignette M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
Marriage 2.93 (1.49) 2.20* (1.07) 2.25 (1.30)
Sex 2.67 (1.53) 1.90* (0.93) 2.40 (1.69)
Driving 5.48 (1.36) 4.98 (1.48) 4.95 (1.38)
Film 3.45 (1.62) 3.03 (1.58) 2.63* (1.13)
Mean 3.75 (0.88) 3.15** (0.69) 3.18** (0.79)
NOTE: n = 40 for each condition. Minimum and maximum scores for each item were 1 and 7. High scores indicate permissibility; low scores
indicate moral condemnation.
*p < .05. **p < .01, pairwise comparison to control by Tukey’s honestly significant difference test.
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across a wide variety of behaviors and feelings (e.g.,
Duclos & Laird, 2001; Schnall, Abrahamson, & Laird,
2002; Schnall & Laird, 2003). 
We investigated such individual differences as a
potential moderator of the role of disgust in moral
judgment. Miller, Murphy, and Buss (1981) devised a
scale to measure people’s general attention to internal
physical states, which they refer to as Private Body
Consciousness (PBC). Of special relevance to the cur-
rent project is a study on the relationship between PBC
and problem-solving style. Baradell and Klein (1993)
demonstrated that the quality of problem solving dete-
riorated under conditions of high stress for high- but
not low-PBC participants. Experiment 2 was con-
ducted with these findings in mind. Participants came
to the laboratory and sat at either a disgusting or a
nondisgusting desk while filling out a questionnaire
that included moral judgment vignettes. We predicted
that experimentally induced disgust would make
moral judgments more severe but that this effect
would be limited to participants who were more sensi-
tive to their own physical sensations, as indicated by a
high level of PBC. 
We also sought to investigate the specificity of the
disgust–morality connection in two ways. First, we
tested whether the effect of the disgust manipulation
would be stronger for moral issues involving disgust
than for those not involving disgust. Is the effect
enhanced by a match between disgust feelings and phys-
ically disgusting elements in a story? Theories about
“social disgust” (Rozin et al., 2000) suggest that disgust
is easily applied or extended to purely social violations.
Critics have argued, however, that there is no such thing
as social disgust and that people are speaking metaphor-
ically when they call social actions disgusting (Bloom,
2004; Nabi, 2002). We predicted that physical disgust
would enhance the severity of all types of moral judg-
ments, although we were agnostic as to whether there
would be a larger effect for disgusting versus nondis-
gusting moral violations. 
We examined the specificity of the disgust–morality
connection in a second way by examining whether
experimentally induced disgust would spill over to alter
other kinds of choices and evaluations. We included
questions about public policy decisions and about what
kind of activities the participant would like to engage in
after the experiment. For both kinds of questions, half
of the items had some conceptual relationship to disgust
and half did not. We had no prediction as to whether
disgust would create a general bias that influenced
many kinds of judgments or whether the effects of dis-
gust would be limited to the moral judgments that were
our main dependent variables.
Method
Participants
Forty-three undergraduate students (18 male) at the
University of Virginia participated in exchange for
credit toward a course requirement. 
Materials
Vignettes. To specifically compare whether scenarios
involving disgust would be judged more harshly than
scenarios not involving disgust, we constructed a new
set of moral stimuli. In addition, labeling of the rating
scales was reversed to facilitate the interpretation of
results, with higher ratings indicating higher levels of
moral condemnation. Twenty-four vignettes portraying
various kinds of moral violations selected from previous
work (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, &
Cohen, 2001; Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993) were given
to 8 pilot participants who judged how appropriate the
action of the story character was on a 9-point scale. Six
vignettes that generated substantial variance among
respondents (i.e., that avoided floor and ceiling effects)
were selected for use (see the appendix). Three of these
vignettes involved a moral violation with disgust—Dog
(a man who ate his dead dog), Plane Crash (starving
survivors of a plane crash consider cannibalism), and
Kitten (a man deriving sexual pleasure from playing
with a kitten)—and three of the vignettes involved a
moral violation with no disgust—Wallet (finding a wal-
let and not returning it to its owner), Resume (a person
falsifying his resume), and Trolley (preventing the death
of five men by killing one man). The instructions told
participants to go with their initial intuitions when
responding. 
Public policy items. Six public policy items asked par-
ticipants to rate whether they would support these pro-
posals if they were up for a vote in the U.S. Congress on a
scale from 0 (strongly oppose) to 9 (strongly support).
Three items involved issues of contamination or guarding
borders (i.e., spending more money for waste treatment,
spending more money to “patrol the borders” against ille-
gal immigrants, and making it easier for the government
to “expel foreigners” with suspected links to terrorism).
The other three issues did not involve such themes (i.e.,
allowing nondenominational school prayer, increasing
federal funding for social science research, and decreasing
the number of students per classroom). 
Activity items. Participants also indicated whether
they would like to engage in four activities after the
experiment on a scale from 0 (would not like to do that
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at all) to 9 (would very much like to do that). Two of
the activities involved engaging in novel activities (eat-
ing a new food at a new restaurant, trying a new and
risky sport such as skydiving); two involved familiar
and safe activities (eating one’s favorite meal, watching
one’s favorite movie). 
PBC scale. After completing the Disgust Scale and the
moral judgment vignettes, participants completed the Body
Consciousness Questionnaire (Miller et al., 1981), which
includes five items that comprise the PBC subscale, rated
on a scale from 1 (disagree strongly) to 6 (agree strongly).
The items used were: “I am sensitive to internal bodily ten-
sions”; “I know immediately when my mouth or throat
gets dry”; “I can often feel my heart beating”; “I am quick
to sense the hunger contractions of my stomach”; and “I
am very aware of changes in my body temperature.”2
Procedure
Before each participant entered the laboratory, the
experimenter prepared the experimental room for either
the extraneous-disgust or the no-disgust condition. For
the disgust condition, a workspace was set up to look
rather disgusting: An old chair with a torn and dirty
cushion was placed in front of a desk that had various
stains and was sticky. On the desk there was a trans-
parent plastic cup with the dried up remnants of a
smoothie and a pen that was chewed up. Next to the
desk was a trash can overflowing with garbage includ-
ing greasy pizza boxes and dirty-looking tissues. For the
no-disgust condition, the same desk was used, but it
was covered up with a clean white tablecloth. A new
chair was provided, and none of the disgusting objects
were present. A new and unchewed pen was provided
for filling out the questionnaires. 
After asking the participant to have a seat at the
desk, the experimenter administered several question-
naires. Each of the two pages of the questionnaire con-
tained three moral scenarios, followed by three
questions concerning public policy, followed by two
questions concerning whether the participant would
like to engage in certain activities after the experiment.
The order of the two questionnaire pages was counter-
balanced so that half of the participants received page 1
first, the other half received page 2 first. Next partici-
pants indicated on a series of rating scales to what
extent they were feeling various emotions, namely,
relaxed, angry, happy, sad, afraid, depressed, disgusted,
upset, and confused, on a 10.5-cm visual analogue scale
labeled don’t feel at all and feel very strongly at the end
points. Participants were asked to make a slash through
the line to represent their feelings at the moment. All
scales were scored by measuring in half centimeters
from the don’t feel at all end, yielding raw scores that
could range from 0 to 21. Next, participants filled out
the PBC questionnaire, using a scale from 0 (extremely
uncharacteristic) to 4 (extremely characteristic) to indi-
cate whether the statements were true for them. 
Results
Manipulation Check
Participants rated the emotions they were feeling at
the end of the manipulation. Unexpectedly, the disgust
condition did not differ from the control condition in
terms of self-reported disgust. However, we believed
our disgust manipulation had high face validity and that
it was possible participants were reporting their feelings
toward the experimental stimuli rather than toward the
physical setting we had created. We therefore proceeded
to analyze the data as planned. 
Moral Judgments
The primary prediction was that disgust would
increase the severity of moral judgments for high-PBC
participants. We further tested whether these effects
would be stronger for vignettes involving disgust. 
Composite scores were formed for moral vignettes
involving disgust (Dog, Plane Crash, Kitten), and moral
items not involving disgust (Wallet, Resume, Trolley). A
three-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted
with content of moral vignette (involving disgust vs. not
involving disgust) as a within-subjects factor, and dis-
gust condition (disgust vs. no disgust) and PBC (high vs.
low) as between-subjects factors. We tested whether the
order in which the two sheets of the questionnaire were
given interacted with the experimental manipulation.
There was no Order × Condition interaction, F(1, 39) =
.46, p < .50, η2 = .01, and no Order × Condition ×
Vignette Content interaction, F(1, 39) = .13, p < .72, η2 =
.00. Thus, order was not used as a factor in the analyses. 
None of the three main effects were significant, but
as predicted, the Disgust Condition × PBC interaction
was significant, F(1, 39) = 5.29, p < .03, η2 = .12 (see
Figure 1). All six vignettes showed the effect in the pre-
dicted direction. Means for the Plane vignette showed a
significant Condition × PBC interaction, F(1, 39) =
4.75, p < .03. Planned comparisons showed that when
averaging across all six vignettes, high-PBC participants
in the disgust condition perceived the actions of the
story character as more wrong than participants in the
no-disgust condition, F(1, 39) = 5.51, p < .02. In con-
trast, for low-PBC participants, ratings of moral con-
demnation did not differ between the disgust and
no-disgust conditions, F(1, 39) = .86, p < .36. There was
no three-way interaction and no interactions involving
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vignette content, indicating that disgust influenced
moral judgment similarly for both disgust and nondis-
gust vignettes. 
Spillover Effects
We created two composite scores for each participant
by averaging responses to the three public policy items
related to contamination, and by averaging responses to
the three that were not related to contamination. A 2
(policy content: contamination related vs. not related) ×
2 (disgust condition: disgust vs. no disgust) × 2 (PBC:
high vs. low) ANOVA showed no significant effects.
Similarly, we created composite scores for activity choices
by averaging responses to the two familiar activities
(favorite meal, favorite movie) and the two unfamiliar
activities (new restaurant, risky sports). As for the policy
items, a 2 (activity content: familiar vs. novel) × 2 (disgust
condition: disgust vs. no disgust) × 2 (PBC: high vs. low)
ANOVA produced no significant effects. Thus, we found
no evidence of spillover to nonmoral judgments. 
Discussion
Once again we replicated the finding of Wheatley
and Haidt (2005) that extraneously induced disgust
makes moral judgment more severe, but we extended
that finding in a theoretically predicted way: The effect
was limited to those who are most likely to attend to
their own visceral reactions. High-PBC participants
made more severe moral judgments when seated at a
dirty desk than at a clean desk, whereas low-PBC par-
ticipants were not affected by the desk manipulation. 
We also obtained initial findings about the specificity
of the relationship between disgust and moral judg-
ment. On one hand, disgust was not so specific that it
affected only moral judgments about stories involving
disgust. Extraneous disgust influenced judgments about
both kinds of vignettes. On the other hand, disgust was
not so general that it influenced all kinds of judgments,
including nonmoral evaluations. Our disgust manipula-
tion had no effect on people’s evaluations of public pol-
icy issues or on their ratings of the desirability of
various activities. These latter findings are preliminary;
it is possible that our questions about public policies
and personal choices drew more heavily on preexisting
political or personal attitudes without any need to use
affect as information. 
EXPERIMENT 3
Because Experiment 2 used an unusual disgust manip-
ulation, we considered it important to replicate the effect
using a more established kind of manipulation, especially
because we did not obtain any effect of condition on self-
reported mood. One frequently used method to induce a
specific emotion is to ask participants to write about a
time in their lives when they experienced a specific emo-
tion (e.g., Bodenhausen et al., 1994). In Experiment 3 we
used this technique by asking half of the participants to
write about an event that made them feel physically dis-
gusted. In addition, we removed the sentence in the
instructions that asked participants to go with their first
intuition when making their ratings. We wanted to know
if we would obtain the same results when no mention of
intuitive feelings was made. 
Method
Participants
Sixty-nine undergraduate students (17 male) at the
University of Plymouth participated in exchange for
credit toward a course requirement. 
Materials
Vignettes. The same vignettes as in Experiment 2
were used. 
Mood induction. In the disgust condition, partici-
pants were asked to write about a specific event that
happened to them that involved seeing or touching
something physically disgusting. Instructions specified
that the event should be one that made the participant
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Figure 1 Judgments of wrongness of moral actions as a function of
Private Body Consciousness and condition (Experiment 2).
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were asked to relive the experience and were given 6
min to write down as much detail as possible on an
answer sheet. No such instructions were given to par-
ticipants in the no-disgust condition. 
PBC scale. The same scale as in Experiment 2 was used. 
Pre- and postmood ratings. At the beginning of the
experiment all participants completed mood ratings of
relaxed, angry, happy, sad, afraid, depressed, disgusted,
upset, and confused, on 10.5-cm visual analogue scales
labeled don’t feel at all and feel very strongly at the end
points, with the instruction to indicate current feelings.
At the end of the experiment the same items were pre-
sented again. 
Procedure
Participants were tested individually and were provided
with a packet of forms to complete. All participants first
received the pretest emotion rating scale. Participants in
the disgust condition then received instructions for the
Life Event Inventory that asked them to recall a physically
disgusting experience, whereas participants in the no-
disgust condition did not. The rest of the packet was iden-
tical for both conditions and consisted of the six moral
vignettes, the Body Consciousness Questionnaire, and the
posttest emotion rating scales. 
Results
Manipulation Check
As an initial manipulation check the narratives pro-
duced by the disgust condition were inspected to ensure
that participants had indeed recalled physically disgusting
events. Two participants were identified who wrote
primarily about moral disgust rather than physical disgust;
their data were excluded. Two additional participants
wrote primarily about feeling emotions other than disgust
(one fear, one anger); their data were excluded as well. 
We expected that participants in the disgust condi-
tion would report feeling more disgusted at the end of
the experiment compared to their baseline. Feelings of
disgust as reported at the end of the experiment were
analyzed by a one-way ANCOVA with condition as a
variable and baseline disgust as a covariate. The disgust
condition gave significantly higher ratings (M = 2.04,
SD = 2.59) than the no-disgust condition (M = 1.16,
SD = 1.22), F(1, 62) = 4.05, p < .05, ηp2 = .06. On the
other eight emotion ratings there were no effects of con-
dition, with the exception of an unpredicted difference
in which participants in the disgust condition felt more
relaxed afterward, F(1, 62) = 4.62, p < .04. 
Moral Judgments
As in Experiment 2, our prediction was that disgust
would increase the severity of moral judgments for high-
PBC participants. Composite scores of moral vignettes
involving disgust and moral items not involving disgust
were submitted to a three-way repeated measures
ANOVA with vignette content as a within-subjects factor,
and condition and PBC as between-subjects factors. There
were no main effects, but as predicted, the Disgust
Condition × PBC interaction was significant, F(1, 61) =
4.49, p < .04, ηp2 = .07 (see Figure 2). Five of the six
vignettes showed the same pattern, with high-PBC partic-
ipants in the disgust condition giving higher morality rat-
ings than participants in the no-disgust condition. Planned
comparisons indicated that high-PBC participants in the
disgust condition exhibited a marginal tendency to per-
ceive the actions of the story character as more wrong
than participants in the no-disgust condition, F(1, 61) =
3.10, p < .08. In contrast, for low-PBC participants, rat-
ings of moral condemnation showed no such effect, F(1,
61) = 1.56, p < .22. There was no three-way interaction (p
> .44) and no other interactions involving vignette content
(ps > .52), indicating that the effect generalized across dis-
gusting and nondisgusting moral violations. 
Discussion
Experiment 3 replicated the findings of Experiment
2: Induced disgust makes moral judgment more severe
but only for participants who are generally sensitive to
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Figure 2 Judgments of wrongness of moral actions as a function of
Private Body Consciousness and condition (Experiment 3).
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the disgust manipulation had no effect. Experiment 3
also addressed two weaknesses of Experiment 2. This
time, the manipulation check confirmed that the two
experimental groups differed in their self-reported dis-
gust. Also, this time we obtained the same results with-
out asking participants to follow their intuitive feelings.
EXPERIMENT 4
Although Experiments 2 and 3 provided evidence about
the specificity of the effects of disgust on judgment, they
did not test whether these effects are specific to disgust as
opposed to any other negative emotion. We cannot rule
out the possibility that any negative emotion, such as sad-
ness, would have made moral judgments more severe. 
Experiment 4 induced two negative emotions by hav-
ing participants watch film clips previously shown
(Lerner et al., 2004) to elicit disgust and sadness.3 A
comparison group watched a neutral film clip. We
expected that participants in the disgust condition, but
not in the sadness condition, would show the same pat-
tern of results as in Experiments 2 and 3. 
Method
Participants
One hundred and thirty-three undergraduate students
(60 male) at the University of Plymouth participated in
exchange for course credit or for payment. Three partici-
pants were excluded for not following instructions. 
Materials
The moral judgment vignettes were the same as in
Experiment 2. Film clips previously shown to result in
disgust (a scene from Trainspotting involving a disgust-
ing toilet) and sadness (a scene from The Champ where
a boy watches his father die) were used. An emotionally
neutral film clip consisted of a scene about whales from
the documentary Planet Earth. 
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to watch one of
the three films immediately before completing the moral
judgment vignettes. They then filled out the PBC scale
and the emotion rating scale used in Experiment 2. 
Results
Manipulation Check
Self-reported disgust varied significantly as a function
of condition, F(2, 114) = 107.05, p < .0001, ηp2 = .65,
with planned contrasts indicating that participants in
the disgust condition (M = 11.35, SD = 5.63) gave sig-
nificantly higher ratings of disgust than participants in
the sadness (M = 1.51, SD = 1.55, p < .0001) and neu-
tral (M = 1.20, SD = 1.69, p < .0001) conditions.
Similarly, conditions differed on reported sadness, F(2,
114) = 30.37, p < .0001, ηp2 = .35, with participants in
the sadness condition (M = 4.72, SD = 3.05) reporting
more sadness than those in the disgust (M = 1.58, SD =
1.97, p < .0001) or neutral (M = 1.04, SD = 1.48, p <
.0001) conditions. Thus, as in the original Lerner et al.
(2004) research using the same film clips, we were suc-
cessful at inducing specific emotional feelings. 
To examine the effects of specific emotions on moral
judgment we inspected boxplots for outliers (outside of
three box lengths) on self-reported emotions inconsistent
with the intended experimental emotion. Similar tech-
niques have been used to demonstrate mood effects in
participants for whom the mood induction was unam-
biguously successful at inducing the target emotion (e.g.,
Bower, Monteiro, & Gilligan, 1978; Storbeck & Clore,
2005). For example, we did not retain participants in the
disgust condition who had unusually high ratings for
sadness. Eleven outliers were excluded from analyses.
Moral Judgments
As in Experiment 2 we created composite scores for
vignettes involving disgust (Dog, Plane Crash, Kitten)
and for vignettes not involving disgust (Wallet, Resume,
Trolley). We conducted a repeated measures ANOVA
with content of vignette (involving disgust vs. not involv-
ing disgust) as a within-subjects factor, and film condi-
tion (disgust vs. sadness vs. neutral), PBC (high vs. low)
and sex (male vs. female) as between-subjects factors.
There was a marginally significant Disgust Condition ×
PBC interaction, F(2, 104) = 2.70, p < .07, ηp2 = .05.
Furthermore, there was an effect of sex, with females
(M = 5.41, SD = 1.45) giving generally more severe judg-
ments than males (M = 4.63, SD = 1.54), F(1, 104) =
12.15, p < .001, ηp2 = .11. 
More important, we tested our predictions and com-
pared high-PBC participants in the disgust condition
with their counterparts in the sadness and neutral con-
ditions. For this initial comparison we merged the sad-
ness and neutral conditions and found that participants
in the disgust condition gave more severe moral judg-
ments than did participants in the two comparison con-
ditions, F(1, 104) = 4.11, p < .05 (see Figure 3). This
was not the case for low-PBC participants, F(1, 104) =
.27, p < .61. Further comparisons showed that high-
PBC participants in the disgust condition gave signifi-
cantly higher ratings than did those in the sadness
condition, F(1, 104) = 4.68, p < .03, and there was a
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trend for the comparison with the neutral condition, F(1,
104) = 1.82, p < .18. It is interesting that the means for the
sadness condition were lower than the means for the neu-
tral condition, further supporting the notion that the effects
of disgust are not just due to it being a negative emotion. As
in Experiments 2 and 3, no three-way Vignette Content ×
Condition × PBC interaction was found, p < .55, indicating
that disgust influenced moral judgment similarly for both
disgust and nondisgust vignettes. 
Discussion
Experiment 4 addressed the critical issue of the speci-
ficity of the effects documented in Experiments 1-3. We
induced highly specific feelings of disgust or sadness and
found that induced disgust made moral judgments more
severe than did induced sadness. In fact, sadness showed
a trend in the opposite direction of influence on moral
judgment. We do not know if this trend is reliable, but
it suggests that the effects of disgust on moral judgment
are not merely a manifestation of a general tendency for
negative affect to amplify moral judgments. It thus
appears that the more clearly participants are experi-
encing disgust, the more directly this feeling is taken as
input to moral judgments. Although an objection might
be made that such a direct link could be indicative of
semantic priming, by activating the concept of disgust in
the film, and again activating the concept of disgust in
the vignettes, the moderating effect of PBC suggests this
is not the case: As in Experiments 2 and 3, effects on
moral judgments were only present for participants who
were susceptible to feeling disgust because they were
generally sensitive to their own bodily cues. 
META-ANALYSIS COMBINING DATA FROM
EXPERIMENTS 2-4
In Experiments 2-4 we found evidence that high-PBC
participants were prone to making more severe moral
judgments when exposed to a disgust manipulation rel-
ative to not being exposed to such a manipulation.
Although all data show the same general pattern, some of
the effects were only marginally significant. Thus, to
assess whether the predicted effect was reliable, we con-
ducted a meta-analysis combining all data sets and test-
ing for the interaction of condition and PBC. We
expressed the composite moral judgments for the three
experiments as Z scores and conducted a three-way
ANOVA with condition, PBC, and experiment as factors.
We found a significant Condition × PBC interaction, F(2,
210) = 4.99, p < .008, ηp2 = .05. More important, the crit-
ical planned comparison for high-PBC participants
between the disgust and no-disgust conditions was also
significant, F(1, 210) = 5.58, p < .02. Thus, it is clear that
across the four manipulations of disgust there was one
common effect. For high-PBC (but not low-PBC) people,
our disgust manipulations increased the severity of
moral condemnation relative to the neutral conditions.
In addition, there was a significant main effect of condi-
tion, F(2, 210) = 3.06, p < .05, ηp2 = .03, with highest
means for the disgust condition, followed by the no-
disgust condition and the sadness condition.
The within-subjects nature of some of our variables
made the ANOVA approach advisable from an analytic
as well as a presentational perspective. Of course, the
use of median splits on a continuous variable is some-
times inadvisable, in part because an adventitious loca-
tion of the median might create two groups that differ
only by chance. However, inspection of the scatterplots
does not show that to be the case, and three replications
of the effect in different samples as well as in the meta-
analysis argues convincingly against that possibility. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Four studies involving four ways of inducing disgust
found a causal relationship between feelings of physical
disgust and moral condemnation. In addition, the results
addressed four aspects of this relationship. First, we found
that the effect of disgust applies regardless of whether the
action to be judged is itself disgusting. Second, the results
showed evidence of discriminative validity in that disgust
influenced moral, but not additional nonmoral, judg-
ments. Third, because the effect occurred most strongly
for people who were sensitive to their own bodily cues,
the results appear to concern feelings of disgust rather
than merely the primed concept of disgust. Fourth, that
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Figure 3 Judgments of wrongness of moral actions as a function of
Private Body Consciousness and condition (Experiment 4).
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there is something special about the connection between
disgust and morality was indicated by the fact that
induced sadness did not have similar effects. 
Our interpretation of these results flows jointly from
the social intuitionist model of moral judgment (Haidt,
2001) and the affect-as-information approach to evalu-
ative judgments more generally (Clore et al., 2001;
Schwarz & Clore, 1983). Both propose an affective
basis for judgments. The affect-as-information hypothe-
sis proposes that evaluative judgments reflect affective
reactions to the object being judged and focuses on the
dynamics of affect use. In short, it says that when
making evaluative judgments, flashes of feeling often
inform us about how we feel about a situation—whether
we like it or dislike it. 
The social intuitionist model (Haidt, 2001; Haidt &
Graham, 2007) describes specific mappings between
moral emotions and kinds of moral judgments. It says that
all negative emotions are not the same; disgust, anger, and
contempt play the primary roles as motivators of moral
condemnation of others (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt,
1999). In Experiment 4 we demonstrated a difference
between the effects of disgust and those of sadness. In
future studies researchers could attempt the more difficult
task of examining whether other morality-relevant emo-
tions, such as anger, have effects different from disgust.
However, our findings on the specificity, or match
between disgust and story content, suggest that such dif-
ferentiation may be hard to demonstrate. We found that
disgust influenced judgments of nondisgusting moral vio-
lations as much as it influenced judgments of disgusting
moral violations. It is possible that extraneous anger
would show a similar breadth of influence.
Informativeness and Attribution
Although emotional reactions are themselves auto-
matic and preemptory, the role of affect in judgment
turns out to be contingent on its apparent informative-
ness. Thus, rather than being obligatory, affective influ-
ences on judgment can often be eliminated by making
salient an irrelevant but plausible cause for the feelings.
This effect was observed in Schwarz and Clore’s (1983)
original studies concerning mood effects on judgments
of life satisfaction. In one condition, they drew respon-
dents’ attention to the fair or foul weather outside,
which was the actual cause of their feelings. In this con-
dition, no mood effects were observed because feelings
interpreted as being about the weather seemed irrele-
vant to judgments of general life satisfaction. 
We unwittingly evoked this process in an earlier and
failed attempt to carry out these experiments. As a dis-
gust manipulation, we asked participants to immerse one
hand in a gooey substance mixed from creamed corn,
collard greens, and chocolate pudding. Immediately
afterward, participants made morality ratings. This very
concrete disgust experience, which was not otherwise
involving in the way that films are, did not influence
moral judgments (compared to those who put their
hands in a bucket of water), presumably because the
unusual nature of the experience and its obvious relation
to disgust remained highly salient as participants made
their moral judgments. In retrospect, it seems likely that
any disgust elicited by the moral dilemmas was likely to
be attributed to the feeling of the gooey substance rather
than the other way around. Accordingly, for the current
studies we chose more subtle, multidimensional disgust
inductions, including being exposed to an unpleasant but
incidental smell (Experiment 1), working in a room that
happened to be dirty and disorderly (Experiment 2), and
watching a disgusting scene from a film (Experiments 3
and 4). Our goal was to induce low-level, background
feelings of disgust. Because feelings tend to take as their
object whatever is in mind at the time they are experi-
enced (Clore et al., 2001), we predicted that the preex-
isting feelings of disgust would be experienced, along
with any vignette-induced disgust, as an affectively
laden intuition of the kind that the social intuitionist
model hypothesizes to be the basis of moral judgment.
Embodied Aspects of Emotional Experience
In three of our four experiments we specifically
investigated the effects of disgust on moral judgment for
people highly sensitive to their own bodily cues. Our
findings are in line with recent approaches emphasizing
that emotional processes are fundamentally embodied
(e.g., Niedenthal et al., 2005; Prinz, 2004). As men-
tioned in the introduction, disgust is often experienced
as a particularly visceral feeling, possibly because it can
trigger nausea, throat clenching, and the very physical
process of food expulsion to protect the body from
harmful contaminants (Rozin et al., 2000). Although
emotions generally involve a physical, embodied com-
ponent, we suspect that the strong physical basis might
be even more pronounced for disgust; indeed, in
Experiment 4 high- and low-PBC participants in the
sadness condition showed practically identical means
on their moral judgments, whereas PBC strongly medi-
ated the effect for those in the disgust condition. Further
research is needed to clarify the extent to which some
emotions might be more embodied than others. In addi-
tion, further research is needed to investigate to what
extent the individual difference we focused on in this
work, PBC, is associated with other indices of bodily
sensitivity, such as whether people derive emotional feel-
ings from their expressive behavior (e.g., Schnall et al.,
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2002) or habitually pay attention to their emotions
(e.g., Gasper & Clore, 2000). Finally, if only a subset of
participants use their embodied affective cues to arrive
at moral judgments, questions arise concerning what
kind of information other individuals use to do so.
Based on the social intuitionist model (Haidt, 2001),
one possibility is that individuals who are less in tune
with their own bodily feedback might be more easily
influenced by other people’s persuasive attempts to
shape their moral views. 
Using One’s Intuition?
The present data show that some people are more eas-
ily influenced by extraneous disgust than are others. But
for those who do pay attention, should they? Should
people use their intuitions when confronted with moral
issues? In the present case the answer appears to be no
because people who followed their feelings were “tricked”
by extraneous disgust. Prior experiments in which explicit
attributions of affect to extraneous sources were encour-
aged (Schwarz & Clore, 1983) suggest that it might help
to be reminded that in some situations, the feeling of dis-
gust simply has nothing to do with the judgment at hand.
For example, jurors judging a defendant with a facial
deformity, or who engages in harmless sexual practices
they do not approve of, might need help in overcoming
their spontaneous flashes of irrelevant disgust. Thus, once
we realize that we indeed rely on repugnance in cases
where it is clearly not a kind of wisdom (Kass, 1997), we
can perhaps do something about it. 
However, if people ignore all feelings when making
judgments, they may have little else to go on. Relying on
affect may be a heuristic, but as Gigerenzer (2002) argues,
in many domains, heuristics are not error-prone shortcuts
because there is no known reasoning process that will give
a better answer. If each person tried to figure out the opti-
mal moral judgment without taking any counsel from
affectively laden intuitions, it is not clear that the products
of such deliberation would be wise. Indeed, Damasio’s
(1994) patients, who lack the ability to integrate somatic
markers into their decision making, seem quite foolish,
and they are unable to make up their minds about simple
matters. Our findings lead us to conclude that affectively
laden moral intuitions are often useful, but we need to be
aware of our heavy reliance on such intuitions and of the
factors that sometimes distort them. 
APPENDIX
Vignettes Used in Experiment 1
Marriage
Some U.S. states allow first cousins to marry each
other. The state you live in does not currently permit
first-cousin marriages but is considering legalizing
them. What do you think about such legislation? (1 =
strongly oppose legalization, 7 = strongly support legal-
ization)
Sex
How moral or immoral do you, personally, find con-
sensual sex between first cousins to be? (1 = extremely
immoral, 7 = perfectly okay)
Driving
James is going to work and considers whether to
walk the 1½ miles or to drive in. He is feeling lazy and
decides to drive in. How moral or immoral do you, per-
sonally, find James’s decision to be? (1 = extremely
immoral, 7 = perfectly okay)
Film
Controversy has erupted over a documentary film
about Mexican immigrants. The film has received excel-
lent reviews, but several of the people interviewed in it
have objected that their rights were violated. The film-
maker deliberately had his camera crew stand back 15
feet in a crowd so that some interviewees did not real-
ize they were being filmed. Because the camera was not
hidden, the procedure was legal. What do you think
about the studio’s decision to release this film, despite
the aforementioned allegations? (1 = strongly disap-
prove of film release, 7 = strongly approve of film
release)
Vignettes Used in Experiments 2, 3, and 4
All responses were given on a scale from 0 (perfectly
OK) to 9 (extremely wrong). 
Dog
Frank’s dog was killed by a car in front of his house.
Frank had heard that in China people occasionally eat
dog meat, and he was curious what it tasted like. So he
cut up the body and cooked it and ate it for dinner. How
wrong is it for Frank to eat his dead dog for dinner?
Plane Crash
Your plane has crashed in the Himalayas. The only
survivors are yourself, another man, and a young boy.
The three of you travel for days, battling extreme cold
and wind. Your only chance at survival is to find your
way to a small village on the other side of the mountain,
several days away. The boy has a broken leg and can-
not move very quickly. His chances of surviving the
journey are essentially zero. Without food, you and
the other man will probably die as well. The other man
 © 2008 Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution.
 at University of Plymouth on July 14, 2008 http://psp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
1108 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
suggests that you sacrifice the boy and eat his remains
over the next few days. How wrong is it to kill this boy
so that you and the other man may survive your jour-
ney to safety?
Wallet
You are walking down the street when you come
across a wallet lying on the ground. You open the wal-
let and find that it contains several hundred dollars in
cash as well the owner’s driver’s license. From the credit
cards and other items in the wallet it’s very clear that
the wallet’s owner is wealthy. You, on the other hand,
have been hit by hard times recently and could really
use some extra money. You consider sending the wallet
back to the owner without the cash, keeping the cash
for yourself. How wrong is it for you to keep the money
you found in the wallet in order to have more money for
yourself?
Resume
You have a friend who has been trying to find a job
lately without much success. He figured that he would
be more likely to get hired if he had a more impressive
resume. He decided to put some false information on
his resume in order to make it more impressive. By
doing this he ultimately managed to get hired, beating
out several candidates who were actually more qualified
than he. How wrong was it for your friend to put false
information on his resume in order to help him find
employment? 
Kitten
Matthew is playing with his new kitten late one
night. He is wearing only his boxer shorts, and the kit-
ten sometimes walks over his genitals. Eventually, this
arouses him, and he begins to rub his bare genitals
along the kitten’s body. The kitten purrs, and seems to
enjoy the contact. How wrong is it for Matthew to be
rubbing himself against the kitten?
Trolley
You are at the wheel of a runaway trolley quickly
approaching a fork in the tracks. On the tracks extend-
ing to the left is a group of five railway workmen. On
the tracks extending to the right is a single railway
workman. If you do nothing the trolley will proceed to
the left, causing the deaths of the five workmen. The
only way to avoid the deaths of these workmen is to hit
a switch on your dashboard that will cause the trolley
to proceed to the right, causing the death of the single
workman. How wrong is it for you to hit the switch in
order to avoid the deaths of the five workmen?
NOTES
1. Hereafter, for brevity, we refer to scenarios that elicit substantial
disgust from control individuals as “involving disgust” or “disgusting”
and those that do not elicit disgust from controls as “not involving dis-
gust or “not disgusting.” Analogous operationalizations for the labels
“moral” and “nonmoral” (scenarios that control individuals consider
moral vs. nonmoral) in Experiment 2 allow us to avoid any prescriptive
assumptions about the scope of the moral domain.
2. Because the Private Body Consciousness (PBC) scale was given
at the end of the experiment, it was important to demonstrate that the
manipulation did not influence it. Indeed, there was no effect of con-
dition on PBC score in Experiment 2, F(1, 41) = 1.89, p = .18;
Experiment 3, F(2, 113) = .78, p = .46; or Experiment 4, F(1, 62) =
1.42, p = .24. 
3. The authors are grateful to Jennifer Lerner for generously pro-
viding the original film clips as used in Lerner, Small, and
Loewenstein (2004).
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